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1. Introduction: Feminism and the Death of God
The relationship between feminism and postmodernism is not
always an easy one. A range of criticisms has been levelled by
feminists against this most slippery of discourses, targeting its
apparent tendency to relativism, to apoliticism and, most
importantly, its apparently refusal of 'woman' as a well-constituted
political identity. These criticisms have, in turn, been ably
addressed by feminists identifying themselves with the work of
Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and others.1
There is one criticism, however, which still seems rather telling.
It is raised by Rosi Braidotti, among others. In her Patterns of
Dissonance, Braidotti ponders why it is that the so-called death of
the subject should become a philosophical necessity at precisely that
point in our history when women should at last be demanding - and
to some extent achieving - the status of full subjecthood within our
political, economic, philosophical and other theoretical agenda.2 As
women gain independence, autonomy, and the capacity for self-
definition, why are these qualities no longer deemed to support a
claim to subjective identity? It is a mundane reality that the status
of a community or profession is commonly downgraded as women
gain increasing access to it; is the same tawdry operation occurring
here at the theoretical level?
Since this issue was first raised, it has often occurred to me that a
parallel argument could be made out concerning the death of God.
Is it happenchance that the death of God should have occurred at
that moment when women are at last demanding - and to some
extent achieving - the status of full subjecthood in relation to God?
During this century, women have come to assume those qualities
that were hitherto accorded to man in his relation to God: freedom,
self-knowledge, and ethical and spiritual responsibility. Is the death
1 For an authoritative collection of papers on the relationship of feminism and
postmodemism see Linda J. Nicholson (ed.), FeminismlPostmodernism, New
York and London, 1990
2 Rosi Braidotti 1991. Patterns of Dissonance: A Study of Women in
Contemporary Philosophy, Cambridge, 1991, ch. 1.
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of God the upshot of God's failure to vouchsafe such territory for
man alone; is it the effect of the loss of exclusive authority from his
God?
These questions skirt the philosophical and theological issues
that motivated the philosophical statement of the death of God by
G.W.F. Hegel and Friedrich Nietzsche in the last century.
Nevertheless, they invite us to focus on its implications for
feminism. The notion of the death of God has not to date received
much attel1tion within feminist theology, yet it is clearly pivotal to
the postmodern agenda. Ought feminism simply affirm God's
death? Of are there specifically feminist concerns - such as those
raised by l3raidotti - which warrant caution? In this paper, I argue
that feminism ought to tread carefully in this context since, pace the
received opinion across feminist thought, the death of God is not
clearly cOQducive to feminist interests. Indeed, insofar as feminist
assertions pf female identity mark a transcendental moment in their
analyses, they cannot rest unequivocally on the premiss of God's
death.
2. Two Exemplary Feminist Approaches to the Qeath of God:
Beauvoir and Daly
Let us consider two exemplary feminist approaches to God, to see
how the death of God is invoked at the origins of contemporary
feminism. The first is that of the acclaimed 'mother' of
contemporary feminist philosophy, Simone de Beauvoir; the
second, that of Mary Daly, who might well claim the same status as
regards co~temporary feminist theology.
The atqeistic sensibility of Simone de Beauvoir is palpable in
Beauvoir's writings, nowhere more so than her 1949 classic, The
Second Sex. Firmly embedded in its postwar context, Beauvoir
proceeds ffom the need for man to assert his singular transcendence
in his owq, self-defined terms. For Beauvoir and her existentialist
colleagues, man attains freedom only by asserting his own projects,
his own criteria of success, independent of external legislature. God
is interpreted as an anathema to such an ethic, as is the authority of
the Churcp. While the Church may be able to condition the
circumstaQ.ces of my bodily existence, while it may oppress me
physically, institutions such as these are unable to dictate the
conditions of my conscious existence, which for existentialism has
absolute priority. The radical humanist message of existentialism is
that I am ultimately free to interpret the terms of ply existence.
And only ip this, does human -authenticity lie.
313
This Immense Panorama: Studies in Honour of Eric J. Sharpe
While admitting that many women have found a refuge in God,
Beauvoir understands God in broadly Marxist terms as a means by
which man subjugates woman, while claiming divine endorsement
for his morality.! God provides the illusion of transcendence:
'When a sex or a class is condemned to immanence it is necessary
to offer it the mirage of some form of transcendence'.2 And he
provides sanction for woman's immanence: 'Woman is no longer
denied transcendence, since she is to consecrate her immanence to
God'.3 True salvation for women lies in finding her own means to
transcendence, eschewing those imposed upon her by her cultural
inheritance. Without these terms of self-definition, she will remain
forever locked in immanence, subject to bodily oppression, to the
role for which she appears 'naturally' destined: that of reproducing
the species without benefit to herself as an individual. She will
remain forever 'other' to the self-defining and self-authenticating
male.
And so, at the origin of contemporary feminism, we find the
death of God proposed as the precondition for true self-identity, the
identity of man and so, a fortiori, that of woman. For Beauvoir,
writing in 1949, woman had yet to achieve such transcendence in
her own right; with few exceptions (such as Beauvoir herself)
women have, she argues, chosen to remain mired in immanence.
That is, they have chosen to disavow their ethical and political
responsibility for self-definition and self-determination. But, this
recognised, there is no theoretical reason why women should not be
able to share the status of transcendence that is necessary to full
subjectivity.4
Mary Daly's disenchantment with the orthodox God is
expressed rather more stridently than Beauvoir's. In The Church
and the Second Sex, she nevertheless frames her argument by
1 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. H. M. Parshley, Harmondsworth,
1972, p. 632 ff.
2 Ibid., p. 632.
3 Ibid., p. 633.
4 This said, for Beauvoir - at least according to one line of argument of The
Second Sex - women's bodies do provide a concrete impediment to the
attainment of full subjectivity. This peculiarity of Beauvoir's argument does
not directly influence her argument concerning God, though it suggests that
men are somehow 'closer' to transcendence than women, a contention which
will bear on our later discussion. See Margaret Simons (ed.), Feminist
Interpretations of Simone de Beauvoir, University Park, PA., 1995, especially
Arp's article, 'Beauvoir's Concept of Bodily Alienation' for an exhaustive
treatment of the competing strands of her philosophy.
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reference to her predecessor's approach, refining it to a feminist
theological intent by focussing upon the possibilities of
transcendence created by taking a stand beyond the earthly
hierarchies of the Church. 1 In her later 'Afterword' to this text, she
refers explicitly to the Nietzschean dictum, demanding the death of
a God that transcends us, that stands as an external authority for our
political, ethical and philosophical structures. Assuming a rather
simplistic semiotics, she maintains a strict correlation between the
symbology of a masculine God and the social structures of
patriarchy. So, famously, where God is male then the male will be
God: 'If God is in 'his' heaven as a father ruling his people, then it
is in the 'nature' of things and according to the divine plan and the
order of the universe that society be II1ale dominated'.2
For Daly, the death of God the Father is thus, once again, the
precondition for the emergence of a specifically female identity,
one no longer subservient to man's desires and needs. Like many
feminist theologians since, she argues that the received notion of
God has served to undermine, rather than underscore, a feminine
subjectivity. Indeed, the belief that there lies a straightforward
correlation of symbol to reality leads Daly in the opposite direction
of Beauvoir: in later writings such as Gyn/Ecology, she is inclined
thereby to promote alternative images of the divine in powerful,
gynomorphic guise.
It is well to note that these tWQ approaches to God arose in a
political climate somewhat different from our own. At this early
stage of modern feminism, the very notion of a feminine/feminist
subjectivity was not yet assured; the ~o;nditions of its possibility were
still moot. Hence, the need to develop a feminist consciousness of
the theological investments of patriarchy was paramount. That said,
it must be admitted that each of these approaches faces conceptual
difficulties that undermine their coherence - though perhaps not
their influence - as feminist strategies. The weight of criticism of
Beauvoir has fallen on her tendellcy arbitrarily to privilege the
masculine in her description of transcendence, as illustrated in
claims that if women are to achieve this status, they must distance
themselves from the grounds of their oppression: their 'vocation as
a female' to reproduce. Daly, by contrast, rejoices in the feminine,
the earthly, the natural and so on, though in a largely uncritical
1 Mary Daly, The Church and the Second Sex: Towards a Philosophy of Women's
Liberation, Boston, 1973, Conclusion.
2 Mary Daly, 'After the Death of God the Father', in Carol Christ and Judith
Plaskow (eds), Womanspirit Rising, p. 54.
315
This Immense Panorama: Studies in Honour of Eric J. Sharpe
manner. Thus she reinforces precisely the gender stereotypes that it
has been the task of later feminism to overturn.
3. The Implications of God's Death for the Human Subject
For our purposes, the difficulty of these two exemplary approaches
is that they fail to respond to the philosophical difficulties raised by
the notion of the death of God. Not that they are required to, of
course; for neither theorist was this the motivating concern. While
Daly uses this motto of the death of God explicitly, it is intended
more as a catch-cry than anything else. The difficulties that G.W.F.
Hegel and Friedrich Nietzsche associated with this notion are not
her own. And while certain Hegelian preoccupations are indeed
Beauvoir's concern - to wit, the master/slave relation and the role of
the other in the construction of subjectivity - her humanism ensures
that these issues are resolved for her at a political and ethical level.
The Unhappy Consciousness that for Hegel attended the death of
God is certainly not a theological issue for Beauvoir; existential
angst, such as it is, is countered only by the assumption of full
responsibility for one's own personal fate.
Nevertheless, there are substantive issues that these analyses must
address, if they are to be persuasive on the topic of God's death. In
particular, they must convince us that the God in question - the one
they are criticising - is in fact the one who has passed away, or at
least deserves to have. What is their concept of God? Is such a God
a worthy opponent? Stated succinctly, the God which these writers
decry is God the patriarch. This is a God whose primary feature is
transcendence, this understood as denoting existential priority. This
is God as God-king, who exists in a hierarchy over and above his
creation, and governs man with absolute power and strength. It is
this inequality of power more than any other feature that for Daly
indicates God's masculinity. It is this that leads to the mentality of
conquest and domination recognisable in our history.
And, in truth, this concept of God is not far removed from that
which prompted the death of God theme in Hegel and Nietzsche. It
arose in the writings of Hegel, anticipated by a sermon of Martin
Luther, as a result of the perceived alienation of man from God.
This alienation is the direct result of the theology of God's radical
transcendence.! Where God is conceived as a master to the religious
servile, the result can only be opposition and estrangement, with all
1 See G. w. F. Hegel, 'Revealed Religion', Phenomenonology of Spirit, trans.
A. V. Miller, Oxford, 1977.
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the misery and meaninglessness that attends it. Where man can no
longer perceive himself in the image of God, his isolation will lead
to a fragmentation and disunity in culture as a whole. The only
possibility of overcoming the Unhappy Consciousness to which this
conception of God has given rise lies in the mutual self-recognition
of God and man, each in other. In Hegel's account of history, the
opposition between them will ultimately be resolved in a higher
unity, a community governed by love. It is, however, not at all clear
that women have an individual role to play in this community.!
Developing this theme of man's servility to the Christian God at
length in his later writings, Nietzsche assumes a God in the Platonic
mould. This is a God who, first and foremost, upholds the
independence of his own realm from that of humans. The
hierarchy between these realms is maintained so as to assure the
perfection of all that is divine against the imperfection of creation.
Nietzsche's attack on such a God is virulent: it is the fabrication of a
world-weary populace no longer capable of recognising the value
of the world in which they live. Such a 'herd' are so sick of life
and sick of themselves that they downgrade all that is good and
natural in this life by inventing an opposition between it and a
higher sphere, a supernatural. Man, he maintains, 'has belittled
himself - he has separated two sides of himself, one very paltry and
weak, one very strong and astonishing, into two spheres, and called
the former "man" and the latter "God"'.2 To the supernatural is
attributed the qualities of the absolute - goodness, truth, perfection,
and so on. The natural, then, is saddled with the qualities of the
conditional - evil, falsity and imperfection.
The reverberations of this critique are clearly apparent in the
existentialism of Beauvoir's collaborator, Jean-Paul Sartre. And
from there, the influence passes, via Beauvoir and Daly, to
contemporary feminist theology. But there are aspects of Hegel
and Nietzsche's analysis which are missing from Sartre's, and which
are pivotal to understanding the depth of the crisis which the death
of God forebodes. The issue here is that the death of God affects
not merely God's identity, his role and status, but our own as well.
This drama is not confined to the divine realm alone; with the death
of God, the natural realm is similarly thrown into disarray. For
without a God to affirm his authenticity, the modem subject is no
1 On women's role in Hegel's absolute community, see Patricia Jagentowicz
Mills (ed.), Feminist Interpretations of G. w. F. Hegel, University Park, PA,
1996, especially O'Brien, 'Man, Physiology and Fate'.
2 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Waiter Kaufmann and R. 1. Hollingdale,
New York, 1967, Section 136.
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longer able to affirm himself, to assure himself of an identity, of a
role and status for himself on this grey earth.
This implication of God's death is missing in Beauvoir and
Daly. They identify the symbology by which man is affirmed in
God's image, with its implication that the affirmation of woman is
less sure where God's image is conceived as masculine. They
correctly recognise that this God is to be understood as God the
Father. But perhaps because of that very metaphor, they assume
that in the process of dying God bequeaths to man his property. He
bequeaths to man his dominion, this earth, and the capacity for rule
over it. That is to say, he bequeaths to man his transcendence.
Such theory, we might note, carries over into modem atheism the
idea that man is made in the image of God.
The classic example of this thinking is offered by Sartre's
description of God in the final sections of his Being and
Nothingness, a text that predates The Second Sex, but which
nevertheless owes much to his collaboration with Beauvoir. 1 For
Sartre, man is that being that strives to be God; the image of God is
created precisely so that man may mirror himself in it: 'Whatever
may be the myths and rites of the religions considered, God is first
"sensible to the heart" of man as the one who identifies and defines
him in his ultimate project'. God is 'the value and supreme end of
transcendence'; he 'represents the permanent limit in terms of
which man makes known to himself what he is'. Thus 'to be man
means to reach toward being God. Or if you prefer, man
fundamentally is the desire to be God'.2
It is perhaps no surprise, then, that the death of God should
occur, as I mentioned earlier, at that point in history when women
are first claiming their own capacity for transcendence. In this
context, the death of God might be understood as a rearguard
action on the part of man to claim for himself the dominion
formerly ruled by God. Thus for Sartre - and, ironically, for
Beauvoir also - man is naturally more equipped for transcendence
than is woman. Men are less 'mired in immanence', less
preoccupied with the mundane - the earthly, the bodily - and so
1 See Simons, 'Beauvoir and Sartre: the Philosophical Relationship' and Kruks,
'Simone de Beauvoir: Teaching Sartre about Freedom' in Simons, Ope cit., for
Beauvoir's influence on Sartre's philosophy.
2 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological
Ontology, trans. Hazel E. Barnes, London, 1958, p. 566.
318
Feminism and the Deconstruction of God's Death
more capable of rising above it. l For all that, equality feminism
such as Beauvoir and Daly defend might be said to aid and abet this
death of God the Father, even if only after the fact. This is because
such feminism demands for woman some part of that divine
inheritance to which man has laid claim.
The Nietzschean analysis clarifies the difficulties with this
understanding of God's death. It shows that, upon his death, the
dominion of God cannot pass to man, nor less to woman. In the
absence of God, all concept of earthly dominion passes away with
him, and so too, the notion of a sovereign subject who stands at the
centre of his earthly realm. For the God who has died is not merely
God the patriarch, but the God of ontotheology. This is a God who
stands as the exemplary metaphor for ontological plenitude; this is
God the absolute, the ideal, the ultimate and the infinite.
Nietzsche's fundamental point is that, with the death of this God, all
notions of ontological fullness are eclipsed: not merely the notion
of man himself, but also the attendant notions of the soul, ego, the
true self, authentic subjectivity and so on.2 This is why we live in
'the twilight of the idols'.
For this reason, the death of God cannot provide the means to
affirm a full-blooded sovereign subject, whatever its identity. In
particular, it cannot serve as the precondition for the advent of a
specifically feminist or feminine identity, as Beauvoir and Daly
suggest. It cannot provide the preconditions for a theory of woman,
as a fully self-identified and self-constituted philosophical or
theological subject. For the very notion of the identity of the
subject is thrown into question by the death of God: what is to
found such an identity? Where is the guarantee of its authenticity?
Hitherto, it was God who affinned such an identity, who provided its
source, the ground of its being. In the absence of God, however,
such a being is unfounded, unsupported - or to use a Nietzschean
metaphor, adrift on the sea of becoming.
One may like to respond that feminism is just the kind of theory
which attempts to answer the problem posed by the death of God:
the problem regarding the grounds for legitimation of one's self-
identity. Starting with Beauvoir, feminism has prioritised the notion
of the collective experience of women, claiming it as the ultimate
I For example: 'it is quite true that woman - like man - is a being rooted in nature;
she is more enslaved to the species than is the male, her anim~ity is more
manifest .. .' , The Second Sex, Ope cit., p. 285.
2 Mark C. Taylor gives a useful account of the mutual implications between the
death of God and the death of the Subject in chapter 1 of his Erring: A
Postmodern A/fheology, Chicago and London, 1987.
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criteria for judgements of value. But such a response assumes
precisely what is in question, to wit, our ability to identify what is to
serve as woman, and as woman's experience, for the purposes of
our analysis. The question raised by the death of God is that of our
ability to identify ourselves with the determinacy required to found
our discourses and practices. I~ is difficulties such as these which
are at present motivating the feminist preoccupation with the
sex/gender classification. The questions raised by Judith Butler and
others concern our ability to define 'woman' by reference to any
determinate qualities whatsoever; recent gender theory undermin~s
the inclusive and exclusive boundaries that have been taken to
define 'woman' as such. 1 It shows that the notion of sex itself - and
not merely that of gender - to be ultimately culturally variable.
Ironically, it was Nietzsche who fIrst noted the difficulties that his
line of reasoning poses for feminism - ironic, in that his intent was
hardly to inform its progress.2 But perhaps feminism is, as he says,
a self-defeating enterprise - at least insofar as it must assume a
notion of feminine identity wh~ch will then be undermined in the
course of its analysis. Perhaps it must assume the coherence of
woman's experience to show \vhy the death of God the Father is
necessitated. But that very theory itself implies, in turn, that the
notion of woman is no longer tenable, as a stable foundation for its
theory. We seem to be caught in a vicious circle. And this is why
feminist philosophers have noted that pursuing such a postmodem
approach involves having the ground pulled away from under our
feet. It seems that not only are we left without God, but we are left
without a concept of a feminine/feminist identity. And if so, then
we are without the means to affirm a feminist theory of God or of a
relationship to God that is specific to women as subjects in their o\\'n
right.
4. The Turn to Immanence
How are we to respond to this apparent crisis? Are we to accept the
death of God? How then to avoid its apparent implications? One
1 See esp. ch. 1 of Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion
of Identity, New York and London, 1990.
2 His disdain for feminism is doubly ironic in that his work has provided such a
profound and beneficial influence on contemporary feminism. On this see the
collections of Paul Patton (ed.), Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory,
London and New York, 1993; and Peter 1. Burgard (ed.), Nietzsche and the
Feminine, Charlottesville and London, 1994.
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response, which the tenor of Daly's writing certainly suggests, is that
we need not preoccupy ourselves with such problems. They are,
after all, the preoccupation of a bunch of 'dead white male'
philosophers, and have little to do with the real world in which
women - and men - strive to deal with political inequity. This
response is not merely theoretically unsatisfying but also politically
shortsighted. The questions over how one defines identity may be
Platonic; they may have been thrown open by Hegel and Nietzsche,
but for all that they have ongoing, concrete, material implications, to
which I will shortly turn.
More charitably, however, we might take Daly to ascribe to the
response which Nietzsche is commonly taken to advise. It is to
refuse that notion of transcendence hitherto manifest in the realm of
God and to turn, by contrast, to the notion of immanence manifest
in the natural realm, the realm of concrete human relations. If, as
Nietzsche maintains, the natural and the human have been devalued
for the sake of the divine, then the appropriate response must
involve their revaluation. One must affirm that this, the Platonic
realm of appearances, is the highest and that whatever divinity there
is must exist here before all.
A survey of recent feminist theology will establish that this is the
favoured response. Introducing the topic of 'Transcendence' in
the recently published The A-Z of Feminist Theology, for example,
Lisa Isherwood summarises prevailing opinion with a rather
sweeping generalisation: 'Feminist theology rejects the Greek
dualism of spirit and matter and so finds problematic the notion of
a transcendent God. Patriarchal religion has been to preserve the
transcendence of God as a central component in creating a religious
hierarchy on earth'. 1 Feminist theology is at one with the general
trend of twentieth century thought in its appeal to immanence; the
greatest minds of the last two centuries have embraced this
'heretical' philosophy, as Yirmiyahu Yovel describes it. 2
Feminism's complicity here is hardly surprising: the philosophy of
immanence might after all be said to have given rise to feminism.
For it is only as our attention turns to concrete social realities that
1 Lisa Isherwood, 'Transcendence', in Lisa Isherwood and Dorothea McEwan
(eds), The A-Z of Feminist Theology, Sheffield, 1996, p. 226.
2 Yirmiyahu Yovel, Spinoza and Other Heretics: The Adventures of Immanence,
Princeton, 1989, p. xi. Yovel includes Goethe, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud and
Einstein among these minds. In his epilogue to this text, Yovel provides an
interesting account of the predominant features of this 'philosophy of
immanence' .
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the feminine may be recognised for its role in maintaining social,
political, religious and other structures.
Feminism has in turn contributed to a philosophy of immanence,
offering a sustained analysis of how the most abstract of concepts -
such as transcendence and immanence - have a habit of instantiating
themselves in the most material of ways. For our tradition does not
merely prescribe how these terms are to be understood, but also how
they are to be achieved in this world. And so, for example, across
our philosophical and theological traditions, the notion of
transcendence is metaphorically associated with masculinity: the
capacity for transcendence is conceived a prerogative of man;
woman is, by contrast, 'at home' on the immanental plane. And, as
a result, the duties before God of the two sexes are singularly
demarcated.
Feminism has shown just how fully immanent - that is, immanent
to purely mundane political considerations - a notion of
transcendence truly is. A particularly clear example of this is
presented by Sartre. For Sartre, transcendence is only possible
where one leaves behind the immanent realm, a realm depicted most
strikingly by Sartre by the 'obscenity' of the female sex.I His
philosophy allows for no recognition whatsoever of the role that this
female sex had in creating the circumstances under wllich
transcendence is made possible - not least, in giving birth to that
male subject for whom transcendence is ordained. Nor does it
attribute to such forms of creation a potentiality for transcendence.
There is, however, a danger for feminism in assuming that its
philosophy or theology can simply remove itself to the other pole
of the transcendence/immanence split, and so create an
immanentalism, uncontaminated by concepts of transcendence. Just
as transcendence can be shown to rely on its opposite, so also, the
inverse relation is demonstrable. And so, commonly, feminism will
allow itself to rest on an unanalysed notion of woman's experience,
treating it as given, as an absolute against which theory is to be
assessed. Isherwood states: 'Feminist theology considers personal
experience to be the starting point for theology and this has
implications for our view of transcendence. We experience in and
through our bodies, and so experience the immanence of the divine;
to suggest that God is ultimately transcendent is perhaps the greatest
illusion of all'.2 The point is not merely that this appeal to
immanence has implications for our view of transcendence, but that
it is a view of transcendence. It is a view of how we are to transcend
1 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, op. cit., p. 613.
2 Isherwood, 'Transcendence', op cit, p. 227.
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the merely mundane and earthly, the finite and the conditional.
Where woman's personal experience is understood as fundamental,
where is serves as a wellspring, a ground or foundation for our
theology, where it provides ultimate criteria against which notions of
God are assessed, then it is treated as sacrosanct. It is what is
commonly called 'a transcendent ground of appeal' - an idol of
God, Nietzsche would retort. The notion of immanence that is
being developed here is not a pure one. A concept of ultimacy,
which allows us to transcend the purely finite and conditional, is
reintroduced by stealth.
The issue here is not merely one of how the relationship between
these two terms, transcendence and immanence, is to be understood;
there is a further issue of how the terms themselves are understood.
Martin Heidegger has argued that Nietzsche is guilty of inverting
this hierarchy but leaving the terms of the opposition unchallenged,
thus leaving the philosophy that underlies it intact. l Thus Sartre
and others are able to appropriate the notion of transcendence,
taking it as an paradigm of humanity, while leaving it opposed to
immanence and all that it connotes - including the feminine. But
by the same logic, feminist theologians are able to appropriate the
notion of immanence, taking this as an paradigm of divinity, while
leaving it opposed to transcendence and all that it connotes -
including the masculine. Heidegger's point, which deconstructive
theory has pursued, is that it is insufficient merely to invert the
hierarchy of transcendent and immanent; one must also reinterpret
and reinvest its terms. The point is important to feminist theology
in that it suggests that the death of God will remain merely nominal
while abstract notions of transcendence and immanence remain as
given, and associated with the division of masculine and feminine.
And this is so whether transcendence is framed by reference to
notions of God, man or woman.
Feminist theologies, such as Isherwood introduces, have
commonly resisted the notion of transcendence because
transcendence has been understood on a model of hierarchy and
domination. Thus the transcendence of the other - whether the
other be God, man or woman - rules out ex hypothesi the possibility
1 Martin Heidegger, 'The Word of Nietzsche: God is Dead' in The Question
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt, New York,
1977 pp. 53-112, p. 61 ff. My comments in the next section regarding
Nietzsche's notion of the self-overcoming of God lead me to think that
Nietzsche was aware of the need to re-evaluate the notion of transcendence. I
interpret him as at least acknowledging, though not fully theorising, the
interdependence of these two concepts, immanence and transcendence.
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of reciprocity and communion between them. Interestingly, it is
precisely this concern - to theorise the possibility of reciprocity and
communion - that leads recent 'philosophies of alterity' to argue
for a transcendence conceived even more radically. Emmanuel
Levinas, Jacques Derrida and Luce Irigaray are representatives of
such a position. While there are differences among them,
differences commonly made out in terms of the strength of their
commitment to othemess, they nevertheless share this fundamental
premiss: that without a sense of radical othemess, we will be without
a means to theorise an excess, a beyond of the given symbolic
structures of Western thought. For each, an image of divinity is
considered a means to represent and acknowledge this otherness,
and for Levinas and Irigaray in particular, this image has distinctly
feminine connotations, insofar as its otherness is typified by the
otherness of the feminine to the masculine symbolics that have
underscored the development of Western thought. 1
For Irigaray, a 'sensible transcendent' is framed in the feminine,
by reference to terms traditionally connoting feminine immanence;
she speaks of it as 'an immanent efflorescence of the divine of and
in the flesh'.2 Nevertheless, this transcendent is conceived as purely
excessive to the framework of the same/other and
transcendent/immanent dichotomies, as conceived within our
philosophical, theological and other traditions. Her concern here is
that there should always remain a place, an interval, for the
feminine, beyond the assimilating logic of these traditions. And so,
contrary to Beauvoir, it is only when a radical othemess of the
feminine is acknowledged that there will be the possibility of
reciprocity between man and woman. And, contrary to the
consensus of feminist theology, it is only when a radical
transcendence of the other is acknowledged that it will be possible
to conceive divinity in communion with us. For only by
reconceiving transcendence in the mode of the feminine other is it
See Emmanuel Levinas, 'The Dwelling' and 'Phenomenology of Eros' in
Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis,
Pittsburgh, 1969 and Luce Irigaray, 'Divine Woman' in Sexes and Genealogies,
trans. Gillian C. Gill, New York, 1993. Interestingly, Beauvoir objects to
Levinas' description of othemess as feminine, since for Beauvoir, the aim for
women is to overcome their status as other. See The Second Sex,op. cit., p.
16, fn. 1. For Irigaray, by contrast, women must affirm a more radical
othemess if they are to avoid the ascriptions of a masculine symbolic, to
which both same and other are attributed.
2 Luce Irigaray, An Ethics ofSexual Difference, trans. Caroline Burke and Gillian
C. Gill, Ithaca, NY, 1984, p. 30. See also pp. 32-33.
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possible to accord the other the autonomy and respect needed for
true reciprocity and communion. For Irigaray, the transcendence
of the other is a precondition to woman's becoming, rather than an
anathema to it. I
5. The Feminist Deconstruction of God's Death
The difficulties of immanentalism, as outlined above, suggest that
feminist theology remains plagued by the difficulties of its tradition,
and that it cannot simply divorce itself from this tradition by
reverting from transcendence to immanence. Not only is it
impossible conclusively to leave behind one's theoretical
inheritance in this manner, it is not at all clear that it is desirable.
Our theological inheritance is what allowed us to get to where we are
now; it is only by recognising this that we will be able to move
beyond it. And, pragmatically, our theological tradition has a
wealth that we have still to plunder. Most significantly for
feminism, there is a rich tradition of theology which itself refuses
the characterisation of God that motivates the claims to the death of
God. 2
Here, I wish to raise a point that Catherine Madsen made several
years ago in a review of recent texts in feminist theology in the
journal Signs. 3 She commented that the task of feminist theology
(and indeed of any feminism) is not to engage with the poorest that
our tradition has to offer, but with the richest. It is relatively easy -
and increasingly, relatively uncontroversial - to sound the death-
knell for the old patriarchal God, the power-hungry God who stands
atop humanity, providing sanction for the worst of patriarchal
excesses. Granted the political ramifications of this death are still to
be effected in full, but the theory underscoring them is clear and
1 This said, there remains a question of whether Irigaray fully recognises
otherness as a general phenomenon, and not merely one governing woman.
Serene lones, for example, questions the consistency of Irigaray's depiction of
God in these terms, charging her with making God a projection of woman's
becoming. See Serene lones, Divining Women: lrigaray and Feminist
Theologies, Yale French Studies 87, 1995, pp. 42-67, p. 63 ff.
2 See Brian Ingraffia, Postmodern Theory and Biblical Theology, Cambridge,
1995, who argues that Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida fail to fully appreciate
the difference of Christianity from the Platonic metaphysics that they critique.
3 Catherine Madsen, 'A God of One's Own: Recent Work by and about Women in'
Religion', Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, vol. 19 (2), pp.
480-98, 1994, p. 481.
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coherent, for all who care to attend to it. Here if anywhere is the
place for Mary Daly's cynicism.
What feminist theology is now entitled to address is the best that
our theological traditions have to bequeath. And this includes a
God whose radical transcendence is traversed - and, paradoxically,
underscored - by an equally radical immanence. It is a God who
gives no particular counsel to a patriarchal cause, a God that cannot
even be imaged exclusively in the masculine without risking the
turn to idolatry. If it is this God that we are talking about (and it
should be) the questions surrounding her continued livelihood
become infinitely more complex - and infinitely more interesting.
Madsen argues for the need to diversify feminist strategies
beyond their present consensus in the critique of God the patriarch.
To date feminist theology has prioritised the question of how we are
to conceive divinity in the wake of the death of God the Father. But
the prior question, it seems to me, is one of how this deicide is itself
to be conceived. And, pursuing this question, it soon becomes
apparent that the very notion of the death of God is plagued by
those same difficulties that arose earlier regarding human
subjectivity and its authority. Who is it, after all, that authorises the
death of God? Who is entitled to issue a warrant for deicide? Does
the very notion of God's death not call into question the legality of
such a move? For surely the power to legislate on the taking of life
is paradigmatically God-given and, in the absence of God-given
powers, how is such an edict defensible? Nietzsche himself notes
that without 'a religious sanction and guarantee for our senses and
rationality', we have no right to trust our judgements. l
The most compelling response for a Nietzschean may be to
argue that deicide is demanded on strictly ethical grounds; the
decree is forged in our own best interests, since such a God demeans
humanity. But what, precisely, is the ethical basis for murder? It is
not at all clear that it is one such as feminism might construct or
condone. Even where they have commended other parts of the
Nietzschean corpus, feminist ethicists have been notoriously wary of
the will to power,2 a situation hardly helped by Nietzsche's repeated
warnings against the effeminising tendencies and seductiveness of
submission to God.3 Is effeminisation really one of the dangers that
feminism seeks to avert?
1 See The Will to Power, Ope cit., Section 436.
2 See, for example, Diprose, 'Nietzsche and the Pathos of Difference' in Patton
(ed.), op. cit.
3 See, for example, The Will to Power, op. cit., Section 252. In a somewhat
different manner, though one which deserves closer attention than it has yet
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There are, however, aspects of Nietzsche's discussion of God's
death which remain suggestive, particularly those that introduce a
paradoxical note into the analysis. Nietzsche might be considered
to have at first skirted the issue of the authority for deicide, in
placing the originary pronouncement of the death in the mouth of a
madman.! But elsewhere we find a novel way around the problem:
God's death was som,ething closer to suicide. Two explanations are
presented, with char~cteristic irony, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
Nietzsche suggests, firstly, that the gods laughed themselves to death
when one among them claimed to be 'the One God'. And later,
this God choked with pity upon seeing what had become of
humankind.2 Thus no-one legislated for God's death; it is perhaps
necessitated by the very notion of a transcendent God. For if God
is defined by referen~e to transcendence then he must, as it were,
transcend even himself. And in support of such an interpretation
are comments such as this: 'All great things perish by their own
agency, by an act of self-cancellation'.3
The paradoxes of God's death are pursued by Jacques Derrida,
in a couple of papers on the relation of deconstruction and negative
theology, that is, a theology that refuses the adequacy of positive
speech of God.4 His approach suggests that the deconstruction of
the notion of God can only be achieved by way of a deconstruction
of the notion of God's death. For example, Derrida notes that the
death of God literature calls to mind religious apocalypticism: those
who preach the death of God preach the imminence of the end.
The promise to reveal the secret of the end is of course a
quintessential religious motif; secular discourses usurp this strategy
precisely at that point at which the death of God is proposed as a
final truth, a revelation or ultimate vision.5 The very statement of
God's death shares this appeal to the transcendental.
been given, Hegel correlates the realm of religion with the feminine, domestic
realm - and indeed with the realm of death.
1 The Gay Science, trans. WaIter Kaufmann, Harmondsworth, 1969, Part 11,
Section 125.
2 See Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth, 1961,
'On Apostates' and 'Retired', Third and Fourth Parts respectively.
3 On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. WaIter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale,
Harmondsworth, 1967, Part Ill, Section 27.
4 See 'Of an Apocalyptic Tone Newly Adopted in Philosophy' and 'How to Avoid
Speaking: Denials' both in Harold Coward and Toby Foshay (eds), Derrida and
Negative Theology, Albany, 1992.
5 Derrida, 'Of an Apocalyptic Tone Newly Adopted in Philosophy', Ope cit., p.
53.
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Feminist theology may well benefit from the negative
theological tenor of these writings, insofar as this allows it to refuse
traditional masculine imaging of God. Such symbolism merely
reflects our incapacity to represent the transcendent. Feminism is,
after all, thoroughly familiar with the process by which male-
defined terms are projected outwards, and has been successful in
elaborating the implications of such projections for those who
introject them. It is also familiar with the disparity between the
symbolic realm so constituted and the truth it purports to capture.
Our symbolism of the divine, even while it refers to social realities,
as Caroline Walker Bynum notes, never simply transcribes or
prescribes them. 1 There remains, therefore, always an alienation
between immanent and transcendent realms, between same and
other; the transcendent, the other remains always radically other.
This alienation is captured in the theme of the death of God.
While it is true that the radical transcendence of the other allows
the notion of the death of God, it also allows us to demonstrate that
the death of God can never fully capture the truth of our relations
to the other. If the other remains always transcendent, then the
conditions exist to reconceptualise it in terms that more fully reflect
our experience of this transcendence in the immanent realm. Such
reconceptualisations are never final; they will never allow us to
capture the other in its very othemess. But, as John D. Caputo
recently argued of Derrida, what is of primary concern here is that
we leave space for another other, an other we may not yet have
recognised or acknowledged.2 Feminism is, first of all, a discourse
of the other; it must be wary of acquiescing to those strategies
intended to rule out other such discourses by fiat.
1 Caroline Walker Bynum, Stevan Harrell, and PauIa Richman (eds), Gender and
Religion: The Complexity of Symbols, Boston, 1986, p. 2.
2 John Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without
Religion, Bloomington and Indianapolis 1997, p. 41 ff.
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